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I. International Business Developments
A. GATS
In March 1999, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),1 went into effect.
Although negotiated in 1994, the treaty only went into force in 1999, according to the
schedule previously determined in the Fifth Protocol.2 GATS is a multilateral, international
agreement whose signatories have agreed to create enforceable rights to trade in services
based on the principles of "national treatment" (nondiscrimination among locals and for-
eigners), and "most-favored-nation status" (equal treatment of all the other members of the
agreement). The agreement is designed to enhance free trade of services such as insurance
and reinsurance among the signatories by providing an agreed framework for reducing
prejudicial regulations, and a system for adjudicating trade disputes through the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
India, long a closed and government-monopolized market, is a signatory to GATS and
is expected to open its market to foreigners through the licensing of branch offices and
limited, direct foreign ownership. Reports suggest India may pass legislation, the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority Bill of 1998, by the end of this year, which would
allow the licensing of private insurers and foreign equity participation, to a maximum of
twenty-six percent, in joint venture insurance companies.' However, as India has been in-
volved in a general parliamentary election, the bill may be delayed. In anticipation of the
bill, India has nonetheless begun the registration of names for new private insurance com-
panies.4
Brazil, another monopolistic market, and one that has not yet approved GATS, has an-
nounced that it expects to privatize Instituto de Reasseguros de Brasil, S.A. (IRB), the
country's reinsurance monopoly, this year. The move has been anticipated since 1996 when
the enabling legislation was first passed, but implementation has been long delayed. Most
recently, the auction of 100 percent of IRB's voting stock and fifty percent of its capital
stock, originally scheduled for this autumn, has been postponed until the year 2000, pending
passage of related legislation. In addition, local tax authorities have recently demanded that
IRB begin paying taxes on its premium income, which it was never required to do before.
Some board members have resigned in protest.'
The United States is moving to improve the competitiveness of U.S. insurers in the
increasingly more global insurance market. Thus, the Policyholder Disaster Protection Act
of 1999,6 pending in Congress, would, among other things, change the tax treatment of
loss reserves for unincurred liabilities, i.e., funding set aside for future risks such as hurri-
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex I B, 33 1.L.M. 1125,
1167 (1994).
2. Fifth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 3, 1997, WTO Doc. S/L/45 (1997).
3. See N. Vasuki Rao, India Regulator Hopes Next Administration Passes Bill on Ventures with Foreign Firms, J.
COM., May 18, 1999, at 10A.
4. See N. Vasuki Rao, India to Allow Insurers to Register Names, J. COM., Aug. 24, 1999, at 18.
5. See Brendan Noonan, Brazil Reinsurer IRB Rides Bumpy Road to Privatization, BESTWIRE, Sept. 21, 1999,
at 7, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
6. H.R. 2749, 106th Cong. (1999).
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canes and earthquakes. Such reserves currently are not tax-exempt in the United States,
but are in Europe, creating, it is argued, a competitive disadvantage for U.S. firms.7
In addition, Congress passed modernization legislation' that repealed the Glass-Steagall
Act 9 provisions that historically separated the U.S. banking and insurance industries. It is
argued that such reform is necessary for U.S. insurers to compete globally with foreign
insurers not bound by similar division of the financial services sectors. 0 The well-publicized
merger of U.S. giants Citicorp and Travelers Insurance Company depended on passage of
the bill. II
B. OFFSHORE LIFE INSURANCE
This past year has seen increased interest in the area of offshore life insurance for both
U.S. and non-U.S. taxpayers."2 Life insurance has always enjoyed tax-favored treatment as
a wealth accumulation and transfer vehicle in the United States. However, its application
was, for the most part, for estate planning purposes, i.e., to reduce federal and state death
taxes. While annuities have always been used to shelter taxable income, and life insurance
has always offered the benefit of the tax-free accumulation of cash values, it is only recently
that life insurance began to be used by high-net-worth individuals as more of an income
tax planning vehicle. "Private placement" life insurance in the United States has offered
policyholders the ability, within certain parameters, to choose their own investment man-
agers, but the diversification rules under I.R.C. § 817 and "investor control" requirements"
still apply.
The growth of the offshore life insurance market appears to have prompted the creation
of a number of new offshore life insurance carriers, and established carriers have set up
offshore subsidiaries. Nevertheless, in order to enjoy the standard U.S. income tax benefits,
a foreign policy must still adhere to I.R.C. § 7702 and meet the "diversification" and "in-
vestor control" requirements of the I.R.C., but other regulatory aspects may be more fa-
vorable offshore. For instance, there may be greater investment flexibility offshore. As an
example, an offshore insurance policy is not limited to investment only in public securities.
Also, foreign insurers are frequently subject to less regulation and no U.S. reporting re-
quirements. Offshore life insurance is not subject to state premium taxes or federal deferred
acquisition taxes; however, offshore products are still subject to the one percent U.S. federal
excise tax on premiums.' 4 Lastly, offshore domiciles such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands,
and the Isle of Man generally impose lower corporate taxation rates upon insurance com-
panies than do U.S. jurisdictions.
7. See Mark A. Foley, Floyd's Multistate Devastation Renews Call for National Disaster Protection, TAMPA TRIR.,
Sept. 25, 1999, at 11.
8. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32 (1999).
10. See Susan Sirota Gaetano, Note, An Overview of Financial Services Reform 1998, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 793
(1999).
11. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Law Symposium: The Market Revolution in Bank and Insurance Firm Governance:
Its Logic and Limits, 77 WASH. U.L.Q. 433 (1999).
12. See generally Craig Douglas Hampton, International Life Insurance Presents Unique Planning Opportunities,
15 MGMT. FiN. PLAN. 227 (BNA Sept. 21, 1999).
13. See, e.g., Christoffersen v. United States, 749 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1984).
14. See I.R.C. § 4371 (1999).
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However, for U.S. taxpayers, offshore life insurance transactions must still fully comply
with I.R.C. § 7702, which requires that a policy contain a significant amount of mortality
risk in order for it to fit the I.R.C.'s definition of life insurance. 5 In other words, in addition
to the fund value, there must be pure risk protection within certain prescribed parameters.
The mortality risk element declines as the insured gets older. Moreover, policies that call
for accelerated deposits of premium are deemed "Modified Endowment Contracts" (MECs)
and incur an immediate tax on withdrawal, in addition to a ten percent tax penalty for
withdrawals before age 59V2.1
Citizens of many foreign jurisdictions concerned about local currency devaluations, in-
flation, political instability, the financial condition of local insurers, lack of confidentiality,
as well as tax issues, are also turning to offshore life insurance as a planning vehicle.7
Offshore jurisdictions generally are not bound by requirements as rigid as in the United
States. For example, some countries may have lower mortality risk requirements in order
for a contract to be deemed life insurance (as low as one percent), or some countries may
apply different rules as far as time requirements for policies to be kept in force, or for a
certain number of installment premiums to be paid. The variations are endless, but the
practitioner must be certain that the buyer's policy conforms to the laws of the governing
jurisdiction.
Foreign nationals seeking U.S. dollar-denominated policies may be subject to U.S. tax-
ation in certain cases on policies purchased in the United States. For example, withdrawals
of cash accumulation gains may be taxable under I.R.C. §§ 871 and 1441. The U.S. carrier
must withhold the tax on any gain before sending any withdrawal or loan proceeds. In
addition, a non-domiciliary may also owe U.S. estate and inheritance taxes, and does not
enjoy the benefit of the same estate tax credit or marital deduction. 1 For non-domiciliaries,
U.S. dollar-denominated insurance policies, even with U.S. investments but from an off-
shore carrier, would have the advantages of U.S. currency and investment quality, without
subjecting the purchaser to direct U.S. taxation.
What drives the offshore life insurance industry is its ability to provide the types of
insurance products that investors seek in terms of currency, product design, and investment
choices, with the maximum tax efficiency of local insurance products, but with greater
flexibility, less regulation, and frequently with lower costs. The key, however, for tax prac-
titioners is to be certain that there are no violations of the tax, insurance, or securities laws
of any of the potentially interested jurisdictions. The trend towards a global marketplace
in financial services suggests that countries may not seek to prohibit their subjects from
purchasing insurance internationally, provided local laws are respected.
II. Litigation and Arbitration
A. JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS RESPECTING EQUITAS AND LLOYD'S
U.S. insureds frequently attempt to draw Equitas, the Lloyd's reinsurer, into coverage
litigation involving Lloyd's syndicates. As part of the Lloyd's Reconstruction and Renewal
15. Annuities are governed by I.R.C. § 72, and if a variable contract by I.R.C. § 817, as well.
16. I.R.C. § 72(e)(10).
17. See Tom Daltry, International Tax Developments UK, 6 INT'L TAx'N 285 (1995).
18. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2105.
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Plan, Equitas was designed to reinsure and administer the "runoff" of asbestos, pollution,
other health hazards, and other long-tail claims on contracts written by Lloyd's syndicates
before 1993. A number of related entities bearing variants of the name "Equitas" make up
the facility. Collectively, they are commonly known as "Equitas."
Numerous decisions have been reported within the last year regarding Equitas' amena-
bility to suit in the United States. Generally, the courts have found that Equitas is not
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, based principally on the rule that a reinsurer lacks privity of
contract with the insured.19 Notwithstanding the apparent bar presented by the rule re-
specting privity, plaintiffs have argued that the rule should not apply to Equitas on various
theories, claiming: (1) that Equitas assumed the Lloyd's syndicates' contractual liabilities
and impliedly accepted the service of process or similar clauses contained in the syndicates'
contracts; (2) that because Equitas' reinsurance of the Lloyd's syndicates is a form of
"reinsurance-to-close" or assumption reinsurance, it should be treated differently than nor-
mal reinsurance; and (3) that if Equitas is actively controlling the underlying claims and
defense, it is a proper party to the insured's coverage suit. These arguments have occasion-
ally met with success.20
On a related issue, caselaw has now become fairly well-settled in the United States that
Lloyd's syndicates cannot be sued, or bring suit, in U.S. federal courts, as the U.S. Courts
of Appeal for the Second and Seventh Circuits have now held that each subscribing "Name"
in the syndicates must be considered a party, thus making federal diversity jurisdiction
19. See Idaho Power Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, No. 97-0203-S-BLW (D. Idaho
Mar. 31, 1999), reported in 9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: REINS. 23 (Apr. 15, 1999) (denying insurer's motion to add
Equitas because English law requires strict privity of contract, which the plaintiffs and Equitas lacked); Mil-
lennium Petrochemicals, Inc. v. C.G. Jago, 50 F. Supp. 2d 654 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (Equitas, Ltd. dismissed
because it lacks privity with policyholders and sufficient contacts with the forum); USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins.
Co., No. 95-866 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1998), reported in 9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: REINS. 11 (Oct. 8, 1998)
(antitrust plaintiffs have no contractual right to sue Equitas directly, Equitas did not assume underlying con-
tract); Union Pacific R.R. v. Equitas, Ltd., No. 98CA 1240 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1999), reported in 10
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: REINS. 10 (Sept. 23, 1999) (reinsurance contract did not render Equitas contractually
liable to insured and did not bind Equitas to forum selection clause of underlying policy); Union Pacific R.R.
v. Century Indem. Co., No. 97-CV-6591 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 12, 1998) (finding no privity with Equitas);
Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, Nos. 595-2CC and CV-596-4CC (Mo. Cir.
Ct., Cole CountyJuly 23, 1998) (report of Special Master), reportedin 10MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: INS. INSOLVENCY
6 (Aug. 20, 1998) (no ceding insurer has privity of contract with Equitas in its capacity as a reinsurer of Lloyd's);
Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, No. 96-CV-006626 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Milwaukee County July 13, 1999), reported in 10 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: REINS. 7 (Aug. 2, 1999) (court lacks
personal jurisdiction because there is no contract between insured and "Equitas").
20. See Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., No. 1:96-CV-252 (D. Vt. Feb. 11, 1998),
reported in 8 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: REINS. 6 (Feb. 25, 1998) (plaintiffs argued Equitas controlled the underlying
litigation, motion to add Equitas granted without comment); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Certain London
Market Cos., No. 97-C-0409-C (W.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 1997), reported in 8 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: REINS. 20
(Feb. 25, 1998) (Equitas' close relationship to the underwriters brought Equitas within the service of suit clause
and, therefore, Equitas was subject to personal jurisdiction); Maine Power Co. v. Ernest A. Moore, No. CV-
93-489, (Me. Super. Ct. Kennebec County May 16, 1999), reported in 10 MEALEY's LITiG. REP.: REINS. 2 (May
27, 1999) (plaintiff may amend its environmental coverage complaint to add Equitas parties as real parties in
interest); Unisys Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, No. L-1434-94, (NJ. Super. Ct. Middlesex Co.
May 28, 1999), reported in 10 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: REINS. 4 (June 24, 1999) (Equitas controls underlying
claims and defense thus can be added as defendant); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Owens Ins. Ltd., No. MRS-
C-51-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Morris County Apr. 12, 1999), reported in 13 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: REINS. 24
(Apr. 27, 1999) (reinsured granted permission to include claims against Equitas, conduct demonstrates that it
takes charge of the defense of suits).
SUMMER 2000
478 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
extremely difficult to establish.2' Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a federal district court will only
have original diversity jurisdiction of a matter if the controversy is between citizens of
different states, or citizens of a state and citizens of a foreign state, and the amount in
dispute exceeds $75,000. The Second and Seventh Circuit decisions now lead a strong body
of district court cases to the same effect.22 However, the Sixth and Third Circuits have held
to the contrary, looking only to the citizenship of the active or managing underwriters of
the relevant syndicate in determining diversity.23
B. REINSURANCE ARBITRATION
1. Non-Party Discovery
Arbitration at times involves discovery on a scale similar to that of litigation. Arbitration
panels frequendy take an active role by issuing subpoenas and other requests for documents
and depositions. However, based on several federal courts of appeal decisions in the last
year, parties in foreign arbitrations should not expect U.S. federal court assistance in en-
forcing such subpoenas.
Two federal circuit courts directly limited the availability of non-party discovery in in-
ternational arbitrations by holding that foreign and international arbitration panels may
not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (part of the implementing legislation of the Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters) 24 to obtain federal court
21. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 932 (2d Cir. 1998); Indiana Gas
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998).
22. See E.R. Squibb, 160 F.3d 925; see also Indiana Gas, 141 F.3d 314; Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Ashland,
Inc., No. CV-98-8277 CAS (RZx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1999), reported in 3 INTERNATIONAL REINS. DisPutE
REP. 20 (Mar. 26, 1999) (no jurisdiction since certain Names were not diverse); Bath Iron Works Corp. v.
Certain Member Cos. of the Inst. of London Underwriters, 870 F. Supp. 3d (D. Me. 1994) (court required to
look to every member of the syndicate for diversity purposes); Transamerica Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill.,
884 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1995) (diversity jurisdiction depends on citizenship of all the members); Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. P.J.T., Inc., No. 96 C 3628, 1996 WL 377081 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1996)
(every member of the syndicate must be of diverse citizenship); Lowsley-Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 884
F. Supp. 166 (D.NJ. 1995) (for diversity jurisdiction, citizenship should be based upon all members of the
syndicate); K. Bell & Assoc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, No. 92 Civ. 5249 (AJP) (KTD), 1998 WL 274346
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998) (Lloyd's is a citizen of every state in which its Names are citizens); Allendale Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., No. 95 Civ. 10970 (SAS), 1999 WL 608788 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1999) (when Lloyd's
underwriter is sued in representative capacity, each name must still be completely diverse); Humm v. Lombard
World Trade, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
23. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994); Chemical Leaman Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999) (where plaintiff sued lead underwriter
individually and Names separately stipulated to be bound by judgment against underwriter, jurisdiction was
appropriate); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 44 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (following
Layne, 26 F.3d 39).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1781.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) provides in relevant part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign
or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The
order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international
tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement
be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court.
26. In re Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biederman Int'l (Kazakhstan), 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cit. 1999).
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assistance with discovery."5 In In re Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biederman Int'l (Kazakhstan), 6
and NBC, Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,27 the Fifth and Second Circuits affirmed decisions
quashing the subpoenas of foreign arbitration panels directly to American non-parties. In
each case, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the foreign, private arbitration
panel was a "proceeding" or "tribunal" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and thus
the subpoena should be enforced. The appellate courts reasoned instead that the statute
contemplated only proceedings and tribunals of government entities, including adminis-
trative or investigative courts, acting as state instrumentalities or within the authority of
the state.2"
The NBC and Kazakhstan decisions leave open the question of whether a foreign arbi-
tration panel's subpoena would be enforced if it were first converted into a judicial subpoena
by a foreign court. That court could then seek assistance from the federal courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1782. Such a procedure may be available in certain foreign jurisdictions, including
England. 9
Also this year, the Fourth Circuit, in Comsat Corp. v. National Science Foundation,30 held
that, in domestic cases arising under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the FAA does not
authorize a federal court to compel a third party's compliance with an arbitrator's subpoena
for pre-hearing discovery, absent a showing of special need or hardship. As the only ap-
pellate decision on point, the Comsat decision appears to tip the scales decidedly against
non-party discovery. Until now, district courts had allowed at least pre-hearing document
discovery, but were split on compelling non-party depositions.3' At least one district court
had indicated a willingness not only to order non-party depositions, but to utilize the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to extend the arbitration panel's subpoena powers to non-
parties outside the federal district in which the panel sat.
32
Notwithstanding Comsat's reasoning that non-party discovery must be specifically au-
thorized by statute, the court left a door open for discovery in a case of "special need.""3
The decision did not address the "special need" standard, but it may approximate the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" standard espoused by the Second Circuit. Those circumstances
have arisen in the admiralty arbitration context when a vessel is preparing to leave port.
34
One factor considered is the "evanescent" nature of the evidence sought.3"
The Comsat decision will be relevant in the international arbitration context because
federal courts often rely upon caselaw interpreting the FAA when construing the interna-
27. NBC, Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).
28. See NBC, 168 F.3d at 189; Kazakhstan, 165 F.3d at 882.
29. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, § 44(2)(a) (Eng.); Adam Johnson, Interim Measures ofProtection under the
Arbitration Act 1996, 1 INT'L ARBITRATION L. REV. 9, 17 (1997).
30. Comsat Corp. v. National Science Found., 190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999).
31. See Stanton v. Paine WebberJackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241,1242 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (permitting
subpoenas requiring production of documents); Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42,44-
45 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Integrity Ins. Co. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71-73 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (quashing subpoena insofar as it sought nonparty deposition).
32. See Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Center of Delaware County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 883 (N.D. Il. 1995),
appealfiled, 95 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1996), appeal disnissed on other grounds, 101 F.3d 110 (7th Cir. 1996).
33. See Comsat, 190 F.3d at 276.
34. See, e.g., Koch Fuel Int'l Inc. v. M/V South Star, 118 F.R.D. 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); E.C. Ernst, Inc. v.
Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694, 695 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Bergen Shipping Co., Ltd. v.Japan Marine Servs.,
Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 435 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F.
Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Ferro Union Corp. v. S.S. Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
35. See Koch, 118 F.R.D. at 321.
SUMMER 2000
480 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
tional arbitration treaty, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the Convention). 6 That reliance arises in part because the Convention
expressly applies the FAA insofar as its provisions do not conflict with the Convention.
37
Potential arbitrants must be aware that significant third-party discovery may often not
be available in arbitration. These three recent court of appeals decisions underscore U.S.
courts' reluctance to allow wide-ranging, third-party discovery in arbitration.
2. Arbitration and the Service of Suit Clause
There is an apparent conflict between the wordings of the typically broad arbitration
clause and the service of suit clause customarily contained in reinsurance treaties (and some
types of insurance contracts) between the London market and U.S. entities. The arbitration
clause, depending on its breadth, is likely to require that a given dispute under the treaty
be submitted to arbitration. By contrast, the service of suit clause typically states that "in
the event of the failure of reinsurers hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder,
reinsurers hereon, at the request of the reinsured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any
court of competent jurisdiction within the United States." The apparent conflict between
these clauses has emerged with some frequency at the outset of disputes when the reinsured,
relying on the service of suit clause, files a lawsuit to recover alleged "amounts claimed to
be due," and the reinsurer, relying on the arbitration clause, moves to stay the lawsuit and
to compel arbitration.
Most courts in the United States construing this issue have looked behind the wording
of the service of suit clause to hold that the dispute must be arbitrated pursuant to an
otherwise binding arbitration clause. 31 According to these courts, the apparent inconsistency
between the two clauses is not real. They interpret the phrase "failure to pay any amount
claimed to be due" in the service of suit clause to refer only to a failure to pay any amount
due under an arbitration award. The courts have further explained that the purpose of the
service of suit clause is merely to help U.S. ceding companies to enforce payment of arbi-
tration awards by foreign reinsurers.
A recent ruling to the contrary was rendered last year by a Missouri state appellate court
in Transit Casualty Co. in Receivership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London,3 9 which
concerned the arbitrability of a claim that Lloyd's had failed to make reinsurance payments.
In denying Lloyd's motion to stay litigation and to compel arbitration, the court found that
the service of suit clause, by its terms, was limited to claims alleging failure of the reinsurer
to pay, and was thus more specific than the broad arbitration clause requiring arbitration
of all disputes. It then applied the rule of contract construction favoring the specific over
the general.4° The court also applied the doctrine of contra profrrentem to construe the
36. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
(1999).
37. See id. § 208. See, e.g., Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1997).
38. Cases resolving the apparent conflict between arbitration clauses and service of suit clauses in favor of
arbitration include: Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1971); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 1993 WL 299232 at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. 1993); West Shore Pipeline Co. v.
Associated Elec. and Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 791 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Underwriting Members
of Lloyd's London v. United Home Life Ins. Co., 549 N.E.2d 67, 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), afld, 563 N.E.2d
609 (Ind. 1990); Old Dominion Ins. Co. v. Dependable Reinsur. Co., Ltd., 472 So. 2d 1365, 1368 (Fla. App.
1985); NECA Ins. Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ideal Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Greek Ins. Co., 1984 WVL 100216 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
39. Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 963 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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service of suit clause against its drafters, Lloyd's.41 The court further claimed to harmonize
the clauses by finding that arbitration would still be required for all disputes except those
for failure to pay.
Transit Casualty attempts to carve out an exception to arbitration that many reinsurers
would have little reason to expect. In order to avoid such surprises, the parties may consider
wording revisions that preserve the right to arbitrate, even where sums are claimed to be
due that would otherwise trigger a service of suit clause.
3. Pre-Answer Security
Another concern for foreign reinsurers in disputes with American insurers is pre-answer
security. Approximately forty states have statutes requiring unauthorized, alien insurers to
post a bond prior to their answering in proceedings brought against them under their
insurance policies. Several states, including the important commercial jurisdictions of Flor-
ida and Pennsylvania, specifically exclude reinsurance from the scope of their statutes.42
Where no such exclusion exists, courts have required reinsurers to post security under the
statutes, even when the merits are being decided in arbitration.4 In 1997, the Illinois leg-
islature amended that state's pre-answer security statute to apply specifically to reinsurance
arbitrations.44 The first decision to address application of the new statute was issued in late
1998 by a California federal district court.
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 45 a U.S. ceding company,
Continental, was engaged in arbitration against certain Lloyd's syndicates and London
market companies (the respondents). When the respondents named their arbitrator, Con-
tinental moved for pre-arbitration security under the Illinois statute in the California federal
district court that had previously compelled arbitration.
The first issue addressed by the district court was whether it had authority to grant
preliminary injunctive relief under the Convention. The court ruled that it did, following
the Second Circuit's decision in Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co.- However, the court
rejected Continental's argument that the Illinois pre-answer security statute left the court
40. See id.
41. The applicability of the contra proferentem doctrine to reinsurance contracts is subject to debate among
U.S. courts. Compare Zenith Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 141 F.3d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1998)
(doctrine applicable under Wisconsin law) with Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049,
1065 (2d Cir. 1993) (doctrine not applicable under New York law).
42. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.912 (West 1997); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 40, § 46(e)(3) (West 1999).
43. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kansas Gen. Ins. Co., 1992 WL 367085 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); American
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 1992 WL 162770 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
44. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/123 (West 1997). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(5) Before any unauthorized foreign or alien company shall file or cause to be filed any pleading in any
action or proceeding, including any arbitration, instituted against it, such unauthorized company shall
either (1) deposit with the clerk of the court in which such action or proceeding is pending or with the
clerk of the court in the jurisdiction in which the arbitration is pending cash or securities or file with
such clerk a bond with good and sufficient sureties, to be approved by the court, in an amount to be
fixed by the court sufficient to secure the payment of any final judgment which may be rendered in
such action, proceeding, or arbitration; or (2) where the unauthorized company continues to transact
the business of insurance by issuing new contracts of insurance or reinsurance, procure a certificate of
authority to transact the business of insurance in this State.
45. Continental Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, Nos. C-92-4094 and C-98-3145
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1998), reported in 9 MEAEY's LITIG. REP.: REINS. 15 (Dec. 10, 1998).
46. Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prod. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1991).
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with no discretion in ordering security, finding instead that equity jurisdiction invested the
court with broad discretion in fashioning injunctive relief.47
The court then determined the central issue of whether the parties had intended Illinois
law, and thus the statute, to govern their arbitration. The reinsurance treaty did not address
choice of law, but contained a typical arbitration clause providing that the arbitrators would
settle the dispute in "an equitable rather than a strictly legal way" and "abstain from fol-
lowing the strict rule of law."48 The court characterized these provisions as a "choice of no
law" clause, and held that issues relating to application of the Illinois pre-answer security
statute should thus be decided by the arbitrators. 49 The court rejected Continental's ar-
gument that the parties implicitly intended Illinois law to apply when they designated Chi-
cago as the place of arbitration, finding that the parties' express decision not to apply the
strict rule of law negated any inference that the parties intended to apply Illinois law. 0
Continental has filed an appeal."'
IIl. Holocaust Victims Legislation
The United States continues to take a proactive approach to resolving insurance claims
of Holocaust survivors. In 1998, the New York legislature passed an act 2 amending its
insurance law to allow Holocaust victims, as defined in the statute, 3 to make claims and
bring suit upon life and property policies for the next ten years. The insurers are required
to investigate the claims, and cannot raise contractual or statutory time limitations.s4 In-
surers must also allow claimants to provide alternative documentation that does not meet
the usual standards of proof." Moreover, insurers doing business in New York must file
reports regarding information they may have about such policies.16 Finally, any Holocaust
victim, regardless of residence, may bring suit in New York state against any insurer that
does business in New York state. 7 In addition, failure to comply with the statute will con-
stitute an offense under New York's unfair practices statute, New York Insurance Law
§ 2402, entitling the Superintendent of Insurance to take action, including the imposition
of fines." A class action suit has already been filed under the statute. s9 The class action suit
alleges that various insurers have unreasonably failed to pay claims or benefits under life,
annuity, and property policies issued to Holocaust victims during the applicable period.
California passed a very similar act in 1997.60 Class action lawsuits have been filed in
California since, alleging similar theories as in the New York case. In one California case,




51. See Continental Casualty Files Another Brief Seeking Pre-answer Security from Lloyd's, 4 ANDREWS INT'L
REINS. DISPUTE REP. 8 (1999).
52. Holocaust Victims Insurance Act of 1998, N.Y. INS. LAW. § 2701 etseq. (Consol. 1999).
53. See id. § 2701(a).
54. See id. § 2703.
55. See id. § 2704.
56. See id. § 2705.
57. See id. §§ 1213 and 2704.
58. See id. § 2703.
59. See Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A., No. 98 Civ. 9186 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 30, 1998) available
in LEXIS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2922; cf Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262
(S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 31, 1997), filed before the law was enacted.
60. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.15 (West 1999).
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the state supreme court has upheld jurisdiction. 6I The trial court is considering constitu-




One U.S. case watched carefully in domestic and international reinsurance markets was
United States v. Brennan,63 a criminal case brought against a reinsurance pool manager aris-
ing out of the allocation of an aviation loss. In Brennan, the federal prosecutors contended
that the president and CEO of an aviation pool manager and reinsurer committed mail
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 in connection with claims the manager handled relating to
an aircraft accident. The manager, USAU, was lead underwriter for both an airline and the
ground security company when an insured aircraft was downed by an armed man who shot
the crew in flight. USAU retained no risk on the policy covering the airline due to transfer
through reinsurance and the participation of following, subscribing underwriters (coinsur-
ers). However, USAU retained some risk on the policy covering the ground security com-
pany. USAU ultimately settled all claims, but determined that the loss should be allocated
fully to the airline and none to the security company. The prosecutor alleged criminal fraud
against USAU's CEO, and the jury returned convictions.
The Second Circuit overturned the conviction on a venue issue, ruling that the case was
brought in the wrong judicial district.64 However, the court noted that the conviction was
problematic in other respects. First, the fraud convictions relied on a factual finding of a
fiduciary duty between USAU and its insured, reinsurers, and coinsurers and their rein-
surers. The court suggested that existing Second Circuit law to the effect that there is no
fiduciary duty between a reinsured and reinsurer supported the defendant's position. 5 The
court also criticized the trial court's jury instructions regarding the elements of a fiduciary
duty. The court did not directly address or analyze these issues or discuss the rationale
employed by the trial court; rather, it only raised questions that it suggested should be
addressed if prosecutors attempted to bring the case again in the proper venue.1
6
61. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Los Angeles County Super. Ct., S079615, 1999 Cal. LEXIS 3923 (Cal.
June 16, 1999).
62. See William Shernoff & Ricardo Echeverria, Holocaust Ins. Claims: Getting Justice 50 Years Later, 4
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: EMERGING INS. DISPUTES 15 Ouly 15, 1999).
63. See United States v. Brennan, 938 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), conviction overturned, 183 F.3d 139
(2d Cir. 1999).
64. See Brennan, 183 F.3d at 149.
65. See id. (citing Christiania Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1993)).
66. See id.
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